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Abstract
We examine how deep agreements on domestic regulations affect welfare in a world
where such agreements are influenced by producer lobbies. The answer to this question
depends in a critical way on whether the agreement focuses on product standards or on
production regulations. International cooperation on product standards can decrease
welfare, and this is more likely to happen when producer lobbies are stronger. On
the other hand, international cooperation on production regulations tends to enhance
welfare when lobbying pressures are strong. A key determinant of the welfare impact
of deep agreements is whether the interests of producer lobbies in different countries
are aligned or in conflict: the former situation tends to occur in the case of product
standards, while the latter situation tends to occur in the case of production regulations.
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1 Introduction
After decades of trade liberalization, tariffs have reached historically low levels, so there is
only limited scope for further tariff reductions. As a result, recent trade agreements largely
revolve around non-tariff issues such as domestic regulations. For example, all the agree-
ments signed by the US since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) contain
provisions on environmental and labor standards, and the same is true for most of the agree-
ments signed by the EU, including the recent Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
(CETA) with Canada.1 Furthermore, many recent trade agreements have established regula-
tory cooperation councils that aim to coordinate national regulatory agencies on an ongoing
basis.2
Such deep agreements are very controversial, as evidenced for example by the massive
protests against CETA and TTIP in Europe, which drew hundreds of thousands of people
to the streets. While some opponents criticize any form of economic globalization, most
object specifically to the deep integration elements. The overarching concern is that trade
agreements may get hijacked by special interests, thus benefiting businesses at the expense
of society. In particular, a common claim is that big corporations exert disproportionate
influence on regulatory cooperation bodies, thereby undermining consumer safety and en-
dangering the environment. A case in point was the public uproar against allowing the sale
of chlorine-washed chicken in Europe, which had been banned earlier by the EU over food
safety concerns.
An example of this kind of criticism is the following statement by the Institute for Agri-
culture and Trade Policy: “Regulatory cooperation activities most often take place behind closed
doors, with a corporate-directed deregulatory agenda, and with minimal participation by civil soci-
ety or stakeholders outside of the regulated industries ... Often, the goal of harmonization is to
adopt international standards. These international standards are rarely the most protective, and
they are developed with strong industry participation and sometimes, by private industry standard-
setting organizations instead of by public agencies. As a result, there is strong pressure to harmonize
standards down to the lowest common denominator..." (www.iatp.org/new-nafta-grp)
1See for example ustr.gov/issue-areas/environment/bilateral-and-regional-trade-agreements and
ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/policy-making/sustainable-development.
2Some well-known regulatory cooperation councils are CETA’s Regulatory Cooperation Forum, the
Canada-US Regulatory Cooperation Council and the US-Mexico High Level Regulatory Cooperation Coun-
cil, and a similar council is part of the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)
between the EU and the US.
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These concerns are shared by some academic economists. For example, Rodrik (2018)
argues informally that shallow integration is likely to enhance welfare because it empowers
exporter lobbies and pits them against import-competing interests, but warns that deep
integration may be bad for welfare because it empowers the “wrong”special interests. In this
paper we take such concerns seriously and examine formally how global welfare is impacted
by international regulatory agreements when such agreements are influenced by industrial
lobbies. We next outline our modeling approach.
An important reference point of our analysis is the canonical “trade wars and trade talks”
model of Grossman and Helpman (1995a), which examines noncooperative and cooperative
trade policy choices by governments who are subject to lobbying pressures, and the subse-
quent work by Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2001). A fundamental feature of the canonical
model is that there is no political economy rationale for trade negotiations, in the sense that
the only purpose of trade negotiations is to prevent countries from manipulating terms of
trade.
Our approach differs from the canonical one in three main ways. First, we consider a
continuum of small countries rather than two large countries. This allows us to put lobbying
at the heart of trade negotiations, as small countries have no ability to manipulate terms
of trade.3 Second, in order to examine how politically-motivated agreements affect global
welfare, we distinguish between the governments’“positive” objectives and a “normative”
criterion. Most existing models adopt the same government objective function to predict
and evaluate trade policy choices, thus they cannot address the widespread concern that
trade agreements benefit special interests at the expense of society.4 Third, and perhaps
most importantly, we develop a new model of international regulatory cooperation. While
simple and tractable, our model yields new insights regarding the welfare implications of
deep agreements on domestic regulations, and how such implications differ across the areas
of product standards and process regulations.
The simple overarching logic of our analysis can be described as follows. A key determi-
nant of the welfare impacts of politically-pressured agreements is whether lobbies have more
influence when policies are set unilaterally or when they are set by international negotiations;
3The feature that lobbying is key to the purpose of a trade agreement is present also in some domestic-
commitment models of trade agreements, e.g. Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998) and Mitra (2002). But
these papers make very different points from the present paper, and they do not address deep agreements.
4Notable exceptions are Grossman and Helpman (1995b) and Ornelas (2005, 2008), who discuss whether
politically-viable regional trade agreements are likely to cause more trade diversion or creation, and thus
whether they are likely to increase or reduce welfare. But these papers do not examine deep integration.
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in the former case, international negotiations dilute the influence of lobbies, and agreements
tend to be good for welfare; in the latter case, international negotiations intensify the influ-
ence of lobbies, so agreements may be bad for welfare.5 This depends crucially on whether
the interests of a country’s lobbies are aligned or in conflict with those of foreign countries’
lobbies: in the former case, international negotiations induce “co-lobbying”; in the latter,
they induce “countervailing lobbying.”This in turn depends on the nature of the policy in
question and on the underlying economic structure. Thus, for example, if a country loosens
its product standards (in a non-discriminatory way), this benefits both domestic and foreign
producers, so in this case there is co-lobbying, whereas loosening process standards benefits
domestic producers while hurting foreign producers, so in this case there is countervailing lob-
bying. This basic intuition thus suggests that international cooperation may be less benign
when negotiations focus on product standards than when they focus on process standards.
We now describe in more detail the main steps of our analysis, the key features of our
model and our main results.
The starting point of our analysis is the benchmark case of shallow integration. In Section
2 we consider a competitive setting with many small countries where governments choose
import tariffs. We find that shallow integration increases global welfare, provided only that
it does not lead to large import subsidies. The reason is that trade negotiations empower
exporter lobbies, which then act as counterweight to import-competing lobbies and thereby
dilute the overall effect of special interests on trade policy. In the noncooperative equilibrium,
exporter lobbies do not influence trade policy choices because a country’s own tariffs can only
help its import-competing producers. But this changes in the cooperative equilibrium, since
the trading partners’tariffs become part of the bargain and a country’s exporters benefit
from increased market access elsewhere.6
We then turn to the main focus of our analysis, which is the political economy of regulatory
cooperation and its welfare implications. To focus sharply on issues of deep integration, we
consider a scenario where shallow integration has already occurred, so that tariffs have been
removed, and we assume that domestic regulations are non-discriminatory, so they cannot
5The statements above are based on the notion that lobbying tends to be detrimental for welfare. In our
setting this is always true if lobbies are suffi ciently powerful, but may not be true if the power of lobbies is
moderate. For example, if governments maximize welfare, it turns out that non-cooperative process standards
are too tight because of an international externality, thus a moderate amount of lobbying pushes them closer
to their effi cient levels.
6As will become clear, a key ingredient of this result is that export subsidies are not available, an assump-
tion that is descriptively realistic, given that export subsidies are essentially banned in the GATT-WTO.
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be used to create trade barriers. Also, to highlight more clearly the different implications of
product standards versus process regulations, we initially examine two separate models, one
that focuses only on product standards and one that focuses only on process regulations; we
then put together these moving parts in an integrated model.
It is important to highlight that in reality both product standards and process standards
are an important focus of international regulatory cooperation. Product standards have
played an increasingly important role in deep integration agreements, the most recent exam-
ples being the CETA agreement and the proposed TTIP agreement. It is noteworthy that
some of the most well-known controversies regarding deep integration (including the famous
case of chlorine-washed chicken) have revolved around product standards. Also process stan-
dards, such as environmental regulations for factories and safety standards for workers, have
been an important area of concern for many trade agreements in the last couple of decades,
as mentioned at the outset.7
In Section 3 we focus on product standards, which are defined as restrictions on the
characteristics of products sold in a given country. To provide a meaningful role for product
standards, we introduce two new ingredients into our competitive many-country setting: first,
consumption may generate a local negative externality; and second, products are vertically
differentiated, with lower-quality products generating worse externalities (e.g. dirtier cars
causing more pollution, or more hazardous toys causing worse health-cost externalities).8
Governments can use product standards to address the consumption externality, but they do
so under political pressure from producer lobbies.
We find that agreements on product standards may decrease global welfare, and this
is more likely to happen when lobbies are more powerful. What lies behind this result is
the fact that the interests of producers world-wide are aligned, so international cooperation
strengthens the overall influence of lobbies on the choice of standards. In particular, if a
group of countries loosens their product standards, this benefits producers not only in those
countries but also in the rest of the world, since it stimulates consumption and increases world
prices. If lobbies are not very powerful, the welfare motivations for regulatory cooperation
dominate political considerations, and thus the agreement enhances welfare, but if lobbies
7We note that not all labor standards can be included in our definition of process standards: for example,
workplace safety and health standards do fall within our notion of process standards, but minimum wages
do not.
8In this paper we focus on vertical standards. An examination of horizontal standards, such as compati-
bility standards motivated by the presence of network externalities, would require a very different setup. We
briefly discuss horizontal standards in the Conclusion.
4
are suffi ciently powerful then international cooperation leads to excessive de-regulation and
damages welfare.
These results may seem pessimistic, but they need to be interpreted in the right way.
Our model abstracts from several potentially important features, such as the presence of
large countries that can influence world prices, trans-boundary externalities from product
standards, or possible domestic-commitment motives for an agreement.9 Each of these fea-
tures would introduce an additional welfare rationale for international cooperation, and thus
could lead to a positive welfare impact of the agreement even with strong lobbying pressures.
But regardless of the sign of the welfare change, the more general prediction is that the influ-
ence of industrial lobbies tends to decrease the welfare gain, or increase the welfare loss, from
an agreement on product standards. Thus the more general insight is not that agreements
on product standards are necessarily bad for you, but rather, that the influence of industrial
lobbies on these agreements is bad for you.
It is also important to keep in mind that many real-world trade agreements, including
the GATT-WTO, are concerned with preventing the use of regulatory policies as a way to
discriminate against foreign producers and thereby creating barriers to trade (this is the
motivation behind the well-known “National Treatment” rule). We view this as part of
“shallow”integration, and for this reason our model of deep integration does not consider the
possibility of discriminatory standards. But our analysis of shallow integration in Section 2
suggests that, to the extent that an agreement tackles discriminatory standards, the influence
of lobbies on the agreement is likely to be benign, because there should be counter-lobbying
between import-competing producers and exporters.
In Section 4 we turn to a simple model of process regulations, which are defined as restric-
tions on production processes that take place on domestic soil. These include environmental
standards imposed on factories and workplace safety standards. To introduce a role for
process standards, we allow for local production externalities and suppose that production
processes are vertically differentiated, with cheaper processes generating worse externalities.
In analogy with the case of product standards, governments can use process regulations to
address production externalities, but as we discuss next, the welfare implications of interna-
tional agreements are very different for the two types of regulations.
9In this paper we suppose that lobbies influence international negotiations in a similar way as they influence
policy choices in a non-cooperative scenario. But if lobbies have less influence on international agreements
than on unilateral policies — which could be the case if governments seek international commitments to
foreclose domestic political pressures, as for example in Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998, 2007) — then
intuitively international agreements would tend to have more benign welfare effects.
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Our model suggests that, in the case of process standards, lobbying pressures have a much
more benign effect on the agreement than in the case of product standards. We find that
agreements on process standards increase welfare if the power of lobbies is either suffi ciently
large or suffi ciently small, and can decrease welfare only for an intermediate range of lobbying
powers. A key ingredient of this result is that, as in the case of shallow agreements, the
negotiation of a deep agreement triggers countervailing lobbying, but the cleavages that arise
across the lobbying spectrum are different and more subtle. In the case of shallow agreements,
there was a clear-cut cleavage between import-competing interests and export interests. In
the case of agreements on process regulations, on the other hand, each lobby would like a
loosening of its domestic regulations and a tightening of regulations in all foreign countries.
This countervailing-lobbying effect implies that international negotiations tend to weaken
the overall impact of lobbies on policy-making. But note one subtle aspect of the above-
mentioned result: in spite of the countervailing-lobbying effect, an agreement may decrease
welfare for an intermediate range of lobbying powers.10
In Section 5 we consider an integrated model that allows for both types of regulations
(product and process standards) and for both types of market failures (consumption and
production externalities). We find that the equilibrium agreement changes product standards
and process standards in opposite directions, and in particular, if the strength of lobbying
is above a certain threshold then product standards are loosened and process standards are
tightened, while the opposite is true if the strength of lobbying is below such threshold. As
for the welfare effects of the agreement, we find that when lobbying pressures are strong,
the agreement decreases welfare if the relative importance of production externalities versus
consumption externalities is small — since in this case product standards play a dominant
role relative to process standards —while it increases welfare in the opposite case.11
In the debate on the welfare effects of deep integration, the role of multinational en-
10We show that, if countries are suffi ciently symmetric, there is always a non-empty intermediate range of
lobbying powers such that the agreement decreases welfare.
11This is a good juncture to note that in reality there is a category of standards that does not fit neatly
within our notions of product standards or process standards, and namely, restrictions on the sale of products
that are produced with undesirable technologies or inputs. Examples of such standards are restrictions on
products that are produced with child labor, or products with high carbon content. This type of standards
may be motivated by cross-border externalities (e.g. global moral externalities in the case of child labor, or
global pollution externalities in the case of carbon content), but note that they are less effi cient than process
standards imposed at the origin, so they are in a sense “third best”instruments. These standards are often
proposed as unilateral policies to counter the unwillingness of producer countries to curb emissions from their
factories or protect labor rights, and are typically not the focus of international agreements, thus we will
abstract from them in this paper.
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terprises is sometimes mentioned as an additional reason for concern. It is natural to ask,
therefore, whether or not the multinational nature of production tends to worsen the welfare
impacts of deep integration. While our perfect-competition setting cannot speak to the role
of multinational firms, since there is no meaningful notion of firms in such a setting, the
model can be easily extended to allow for foreign ownership of production factors. In Section
6 we examine how the presence of international ownership linkages affects our welfare results.
We find that, compared with a world where factor ownership is purely domestic, the presence
of foreign ownership tends to reduce the welfare gains (or increase the welfare losses) from
deep integration, at least if lobbies are suffi ciently strong. This is the consequence of three
observations. First, foreign ownership pushes non-cooperative process standards closer to
their effi cient levels, since it dilutes their impact on domestic producers. Second, it has no
effect on non-cooperative product standards, because an individual country’s choice of prod-
uct standards does not affect domestic producers, as highlighted above. And third, it has
little effect on cooperative policies, because in the cooperative scenario only the aggregate
world factor supplies matter, not the way their ownership is distributed across countries.
Before plunging into the analysis, we discuss briefly the related literature.
There is a sizable literature on shallow agreements in the presence of lobbying pressures.
As mentioned above, two key examples of the “canonical”model of shallow integration are
Grossman and Helpman (1995a) and Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2001). It is worth noting
that in these models governments can use export subsidies, and as a consequence exporter
lobbies do not play a key role in shaping trade agreements. But there are also several
models within this broad family where export subsidies are restricted, and as a consequence
exporter lobbies play a key role in the shaping of trade agreements, just as in our benchmark
model of shallow integration: see for example Grossman and Helpman (1995b), Levy (1999),
Ornelas (2005, 2008), Bagwell and Staiger (2011), Ludema and Mayda (2016), Nicita et al
(2018) and Lazarevski (2018). We note that most papers in this family do not examine the
welfare implications of politically-motivated trade agreements, with the only exceptions of
the regional-agreement models of Grossman and Helpman (1995b) and Ornelas (2005, 2008).
The literature on the political economy of deep integration is very thin, and we are
not aware of any model that examines the welfare impacts of politically-pressured deep
agreements. Nevertheless there are papers in the literature that have points of contact with
our model of regulatory cooperation. For example, a recent paper by Grossman et al. (2019)
considers the optimal design of international agreements in a setting where governments
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can choose product standards as well as standard taxes. The questions they address are
very different from ours, however. Among other things, they focus on the tradeoff between
harmonization and regulatory diversity in a setting of horizontal standards and fixed costs
of standards compliance, an issue that is not a focus of our paper.12
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 focuses on the benchmark case of shallow
integration. Sections 3 and 4 consider deep agreements respectively on product standards
and process standards. Section 5 presents the integrated model with both types of regulations.
Section 6 extends the model to allow for international ownership linkages. Section 7 concludes.
2 Benchmark: Shallow Integration
We start by focusing on the benchmark case of shallow integration. The economic envi-
ronment we consider differs from the canonical terms-of-trade models (e.g. Grossman and
Helpman, 1995a) in one main respect: we assume a continuum of small countries rather than
two large countries, in order to focus more sharply on the role of lobbying in the shaping of
trade agreements.
2.1 Setup
We consider a perfectly competitive world with a continuum of countries and G + 1 goods.
Good 0 is the numeraire. Here and throughout, we normalize the mass of countries to one.
In each country i there is a unit mass of citizens with the following quasi-linear preferences
Ui = ci0 +
∑
g∈G
uig (cig) , (1)
where ci0 denotes country i’s consumption of the numeraire good, cig denotes country i’s
consumption of good g, and uig (·) satisfies the usual properties u′ig (·) > 0 and u′′ig (·) < 0.
Utility maximization implies pig = u′ig (cig), which can be inverted to yield the demand
function cig = dig (pig), where pig is the price of good g in country i. The indirect utility
of country i with income Yi is then given by Vi = Yi +
∑
g∈G Sig (pig), where Sig (pig) ≡
uig (dig (pig))− pigdig (pig) is consumer surplus.
12A pioneering contribution to this literature is Costinot (2008), who compares a GATT-style national-
treatment approach with an EU-style mutual-recognition approach, arguing that the former tends be more
effective in the case of vertical standards and the latter may be more appropriate for horizontal standards. See
also a recent paper by Mei (2019), who conducts a quantitative analysis of the national-treatment approach
as compared with a full international negotiation of standards.
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The numeraire good is produced one-for-one from labor. We assume that in each country
there is positive production of the numeraire good in equilibrium, so the wage is equal to
one everywhere. Each non-numeraire good is produced from labor and a sector-specific input
whose returns in country i we denote by πig. Hotelling’s lemma implies that yig (pig) =
π′ig (pig), where yig is country i’s supply of good g.
Countries can impose specific tariffs τ ig on imported non-numeraire goods and do not have
access to export policies.13 Also, in line with most political-economy models of trade policy
(including the Grossman-Helpman model), we assume away production subsidies. There
are no trade costs other than the tariffs governments impose. Finally, we assume that the
numeraire good is freely traded.14
We denote the subset of countries which import good g byMg and the subset of countries
which export good g by Xg. Since tariffs drive a wedge between local prices and world prices
and there are no export policy instruments, local prices satisfy pig = pg + τ ig for all i ∈ Mg
and pig = pg for all i ∈ Xg, where pg is the world price of good g.
World prices are pinned down by world market clearing. Letting mig (pig) = dig (pig) −
yig (pig) and xig (pig) = yig (pig)−dig (pig), we can express the world market clearing conditions
as ∫
i∈Mg
mig (pg + τ ig) =
∫
i∈Xg
xig (pg) . (2)
Total income in country i consists of labor income, which is equal to one, producer
surplus
∑
g∈G πig, and tariff revenue
∑
g∈G Rig, thus indirect utility can be rewritten as Vi =
1 +
∑
g∈G (πig + Sig +Rig). We can abstract from the first term in Vi and simply define
13Export subsidies were banned long ago by GATT, so the model can be thought of as applying to tariff
negotiations that have occurred after the export subsidy ban. While the assumption that export subsidies
are unavailable seems descriptively realistic, the export subsidy ban is hard to explain based on standard
trade models (see Maggi, 2014, for a survey of the relevant literature), but this is not a focus of our paper,
and we just take this as a fact of life. And as discussed in the Introduction, we share the no-export-subsidy
assumption with a large number of mainstream models of trade agreements. We also note that in our model
there is no reason for a government to use export taxes, so assuming away export taxes is not restrictive in
our setting.
14The assumption that the numeraire good is untaxed would in itself be without loss of generality, but
in conjunction with the no-export-subsidy assumption it is not innocuous (we owe this observation to Ivan
Werning). If we allowed for trade taxes on all goods, the effects of export subsidies could be replicated
by choosing appropriate import and export taxes. We have in mind a slightly richer (and we believe more
realistic) model that would not be subject to this issue and is likely to deliver similar insights as our current
model, and in particular, a model where (at least) one good is not tradable. In such a setting, the no-
export-subsidy restriction in general would be binding. However, non-traded goods would introduce general-
equilibrium effects that are currently absent, so some qualifications to our results might arise.
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(πig + Sig +Rig) . (3)
Governments are subject to lobbying pressures, so their objective function does not co-
incide with welfare. In the same spirit as Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1995a), we assume
lobbies represent the groups of specific-factor owners, and we capture the influence that lob-
bies have on the government by assuming that government i attaches extra weights γig ≥ 0










πig + Sig +Rig
]
. (4)
A remark is in order on the difference between our “positive”government objective (4)
and our “normative”criterion (3). We have adopted a utilitarian definition of welfare (just
as in the Grossman-Helpman model) because it is the simplest and most natural one in
this transferrable-utility environment, but we have in mind a broader interpretation: if we
assigned different Pareto weights to different groups in our welfare criterion, our government
objective would reflect these welfare weights plus the “bias”γig introduced by lobbying. What
really matters for our results is that producer groups get more weight in the government
objective than in the welfare criterion.
Next we compare the noncooperative equilibrium with the cooperative policy regime.
2.2 Noncooperative equilibrium
In the noncooperative equilibrium, each importing country unilaterally sets tariffs to max-
imize Ωi =
∑
g∈G Ωig, taking world prices and other countries’tariffs as given. Since each
country is small relative to the rest of the world, it takes world prices as given. This problem







πig (pg + τ ig) + Sig (pg + τ ig) + τ igmig (pg + τ ig) , i ∈Mg
15This formulation of a government’s objective is similar as in Baldwin (1987), and can be viewed as a




, where Iig is a dummy that is equal to one if industry i is politically organized, αLi is the share of
the population represented by some lobby, and ai is government i’s valuation of welfare relative to campaign
contributions. Also note that this model of lobbying implicitly assumes that labor-owners or consumers at
large are not able to get politically organized, since these are large and dispersed economy-wide groups, so it
is more diffi cult for them to overcome collective action problems.
10
We assume that Ωig is concave in τ ig for all i, so we can rely on first-order conditions. It
is direct to verify that the noncooperative tariffs and world price for good g must satisfy:
τ ig =
γigyig (pg + τ ig)
−m′ig (pg + τ ig)
, i ∈Mg and (5)∫
i∈Mg




We assume that the noncooperative equilibrium exists and is unique, meaning that there
exists a unique solution to equations (5) and (6).
Notice that noncooperative tariffs are zero if γig = 0, so lobbying is the only reason
why governments deviate from free trade. And importantly, exporter interests are not taken
into account in the noncooperative tariffs, since countries cannot unilaterally affect domestic
prices in their exporting industries.
2.3 Cooperative tariffs







Ωig taking into account the impact of tariffs on world prices.16 This problem is again


















where we keep in mind that τ ig = 0 for i ∈ Xg in the expression above. In order to rely on a
first-order-condition approach, we assume that Ωg(τ g, pg(τ g)) is concave in the tariff vector
τ g, where pg(τ g) denotes the market-clearing price as a function of the tariffs (it is easy to
show that this function is well-defined).
This problem can be solved with a standard Lagrangian approach. It is not hard to show
that the cooperative tariffs and world price for good g satisfy:
τ ig =
γigyig (pg + τ ig)
−m′ig (pg + τ ig)
−
∫




, i ∈Mg (7)
∫
i∈Mg




16We are implicitly assuming that countries have access to international transfers (in terms of the numeraire
good). Given that governments have many ways to compensate each other in the context of trade negotiations,
this assumption seems reasonable, but in any case it is not essential to our main qualitative results.
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We assume that a solution to the above system of equations exists (note that uniqueness
is guaranteed by concavity of the objective function). The key difference between the non-







equation (7). Notice that the numerator of this term captures the joint political power of
exporters, since it integrates over all countries that are exporters of good g. This captures
the idea that exporter interests are taken into account in the cooperative equilibrium, since
countries can jointly increase world prices through tariff cuts.
2.4 What does the agreement do?
As we establish formally in the Appendix, under a mild regularity condition the trade agree-
ment reduces all tariffs relative to the noncooperative equilibrium. Notice that this does not
follow immediately from a comparison of equations (5) and (7), since they are evaluated at
different world prices.17
The broad intuition for this result is that noncooperative tariffs reflect only the interests of
import-competing producers, while cooperative tariffs also reflect the interests of exporters,
who benefit from trade liberalization. But we can gain a deeper intuition for the tariff formula
(7) by considering the international externalities exerted by tariffs through the world price.
Suppose a positive measure of importing countries decreases their tariffs. This pushes up
the world price by increasing import demand. How does this affect all other countries in the
aggregate? Differentiating the joint payoffΩg with respect to the world price and evaluating
















The first term indicates that the externality of a decrease in tariffs on other importers
is negative, since an increase in the world price is a deterioration of all importers’terms-of-
trade. The second term shows that the externality on exporters is positive, for two reasons:
it increases the political surplus for all exporters, and it improves their terms-of-trade. But
17The regularity condition we need is a slight strengthening of the assumptions made above that there exists
a unique noncooperative equilibrium and a unique solution to the first-order conditions of the cooperative
problem. In particular, we assume that there exists a unique solution to the system of equations given





i∈Mg mig (pg + τ ig) =
∫
i∈Xg xig (pg) for all κg ∈ [0, λg], where λg is the
Lagrange multiplier of the cooperative problem. The assumptions already made above imply that this is
true for κg = 0 and for κg = λg, so here we are extending the condition to intermediate values of κg. This
assumption allows us to define a path that connects the noncooperative solution with the cooperative solution
in the price-tariffs space, and evaluate how welfare changes along this path.
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the importers’aggregate terms-of-trade loss equals the exporters’aggregate terms-of-trade
gain, so only the political externality
∫
i∈Xg γigyig remains. It is this externality that the trade
agreement internalizes, as reflected in formula (7). Note that the net aggregate world-price
externality does not include the political gain for importers (
∫
i∈Mg γigyig), and the reason is
that importers use tariffs optimally to benefit their domestic producers, whereas exporters
lack policy instruments to do so.
While in our setting the purpose of a trade agreement is to deal with terms-of-trade
externalities, there is a fundamental difference between the motives behind trade agreements
in our model and in the standard terms-of-trade theory. In our model, the purpose of a trade
agreement is not to prevent individual countries from manipulating terms-of-trade, because
individual countries use tariffs only for political reasons, not to manipulate terms-of-trade.
Rather, a trade agreement is motivated by lobbying pressures from exporters, given that
export subsidies are restricted. It is useful to note that, if export subsidies were available,
the externality (9) would be zero and hence noncooperative tariffs would be effi cient, so there
would be no scope for a trade agreement. And it is also apparent from (9) that there would
be no need for an agreement if governments were welfare-maximizers.
We record the result above in the following proposition. The proofs of this and all other
propositions are in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium trade agreement lowers all import tariffs relative to nonco-
operative levels, provided the aggregate political power of exporters is strictly positive.
This result captures an often-heard “story”about the success of GATT/WTO negotia-
tions that is quite different from the standard terms-of-trade theory: tariffs fell because the
GATT/WTO changed the political calculus of policy makers, and lobbying pressures from
exporter groups counter-balanced the pressures from import-competing groups, thus diluting
the overall effect of lobbying on trade policy. The standard terms-of-trade story, on the other
hand, is that tariffs fell because the agreement removed the individual countries’incentives
to manipulate terms of trade.
2.5 Is it good for you?
Given that all tariffs fall as a result of the trade agreement, one might conjecture that it has
positive welfare effects. This is not immediately obvious because we are allowing countries to
be asymmetric in a number of dimensions, and we know from second-best theory that partial
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reductions of distortions (wedges) do not necessarily increase welfare. But we do confirm this
conjecture, subject to the condition that the agreement not entail large import subsidies. We
record this point with:
Proposition 2 The equilibrium trade agreement improves global welfare relative to the non-
cooperative equilibrium, provided the agreement does not entail large import subsidies.
This result suggests that we should not be excessively worried about the influence that
producer lobbies have on shallow trade agreements. Intuitively, tariff negotiations trigger
counter-lobbying between import-competing groups and exporting groups, hence diluting
the overall effect of lobbying on trade policy relative to the non-cooperative equilibrium.
We can now turn to the main focus of our paper, that is the welfare implications of deep
agreements.
3 Deep integration: product standards
In this section we start addressing the main question of our paper: what are the welfare
effects of international regulatory cooperation when international negotiations are influenced
by industrial lobbies?
As will soon become clear, the welfare implications of international regulatory agreements
can be quite different depending on whether the agreement focuses on product standards or on
process regulations. To put these contrasting implications in sharp relief, we initially examine
two separate models, one that focuses only on product standards and one that focuses only
on process regulations; we will later consider an integrated model that allows for both types
of regulations. Also, to focus sharply on the effects of deep integration, we consider a scenario
where shallow integration has already occurred, so that tariffs have been removed, and we
assume that standards satisfy national treatment (i.e. they are non-discriminatory).
We start by focusing on product standards, which are defined as restrictions on the
characteristics of products sold in a given country. Examples include emissions standards
for automobiles, safety standards for children’s toys, or health standards for meat products.
As mentioned in the Introduction, product standards have played a key role in a number of
recent international negotiations, and have been at the center of some of the most well-known
controversies regarding deep agreements.
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3.1 Setup
We modify the economic structure of section 2 in two ways. First, to introduce a role for
product standards, we now assume that each good comes in a continuum of varieties, indexed
by their “dirtiness”eg ∈ [0,∞). Cleaner goods are more costly: in particular, producers have
to incur an abatement cost 1/eg in terms of the outside good in order to produce variety eg.18
We assume that varieties are indistinguishable in the eyes of consumers.
Second, to provide a potential welfare rationale for product standards we allow for local
consumption externalities. For concreteness we will focus on environmental externalities. For
example, eg may index the amount of emissions generated by a car. But alternative interpre-
tations are also possible, for example health-care externalities caused by the consumption of
unsafe products.
Since each consumer is atomistic (and thus ignores the effects of her individual consump-
tion on aggregate consumption) and regards all varieties as perfect substitutes, the demand
for good g in country i depends only on the consumer price pcig, and will be denoted dig(p
c
ig).
As will become clear below, in each country i there will be a single variety of good g that
is consumed in equilibrium, say variety eig. Assuming that consuming one unit of variety eig
generates eig units of pollution, the total amount of pollution is then eigdig(pcig). In the case of
cars, this would be the total amount of emissions from cars in country i. The disutility caused
by a unit of pollution for the representative consumer in country i is assumed to be constant
and denoted by aig, so the local externality associated with consumption of variety eig can
be written as −aigeigdig(pcig). The parameter aig can be interpreted as an environmental-
preference parameter, capturing how strongly country i feels against pollution.19
Each government i chooses emission standards {eig}g∈G for products sold in its own mar-
ket. These can be interpreted as emission caps, because in this setting a cap is always
binding, due to the fact that producing cleaner products is more costly and varieties are
indistinguishable in the eyes of consumers.
As mentioned above, we focus on a scenario where shallow integration has already oc-
curred, so trade taxes have been removed, and we continue to assume away production
subsidies.20 We thus assume that product standards are the only policies available to gov-
18Notice that this implies convex abatement costs. Our results extend to a more general convex abatement
cost function.
19We are implicitly assuming that the disutility from pollution enters utility in a separable way. More
specifically, we are assuming a direct utility function of the form Ui = ci0 +
∑
g∈G [uig (cig)− aigeigCig],
where cig and Cig denote respectively individual and aggregate consumption of variety eig.
20If production subsidies were available, producer lobbies would focus their efforts on production subsidies,
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ernments.
Having laid out our assumptions, the first observation concerns the price wedges created
by product standards. Since there are no trade costs, producer arbitrage ensures that pro-
ducers get the same price net of abatement costs in any market where they sell. And since
each individual country is small, its choice of standards cannot affect the net price received
by its producers. Letting pg denote the producer price net of abatement costs, the price
faced by consumers in country i is therefore pcig = pg +
1
eig
. We will often refer to the net
producer price pg as the “world”price.21 Thus, if an individual country i chooses to tighten
its standards, the associated cost falls entirely on its consumers.22 This feature will play a
key role for our results on product standards, and as will become clear, it differs crucially
from the case of process standards, because in the latter case the burden of standards will
fall on local producers rather than on local consumers.


















and as in the previous section we assume that government i’s objective is given by




Note that a product standard is a second-best policy, because given the variety eig selected
by the government, consumers do not internalize the consumption externality. One way to
implement the first best is to combine a product standard with a consumption tax. At the
end of this section we will argue that, if both instruments were available, our conclusions
would get strengthened.
not on regulations, since the former are more effi cient redistribution tools, thus it would be hard to explain
the influence of lobbies on regulations, just as it would be hard to explain the influence of lobbies on trade
policies. While assuming away production subsidies is in line with most of the existing political-economy
literature, it would certainly be desirable to endogenize such restriction within the context of our model,
since this could conceivably affect our qualitative results. One possible approach for example would be to
adopt the Drazen-Limao (2008) model, where a government may prefer to commit not to use more effi cient
redistribution tools in order to strengthen its bargaining position when dealing with domestic lobbies.
21This is the net price that producers of each country can get if they sell anywhere in the world, and also
the price that consumers of a country would pay if that country imposed no standard at all (eig =∞).
22Note that, in our setting with constant returns, there is no cost in producing different varieties for different
markets. In the Conclusion we will discuss how results might change if there are fixed costs of adapting a
product to a country’s local standard.
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3.2 Noncooperative product standards




















We assume that Ωig is concave in eig, so we can rely on first-order conditions. Straight-











for all i, (10)
where σig ≡ −
d′ig
dig














The noncooperative equilibrium product standards and world price for good g solve equa-




Notice that, if σig is held constant, increasing the strength of the externality aig leads
to tighter noncooperative standards, as one would expect. Also note that the strength of
lobbies does not affect noncooperative product standards, since the political parameters γig
do not enter the above system of equations. The reason is that a small country cannot affect
the net producer price pg with a product standard, so this instrument cannot be used to help
domestic producers. This feature depends on our assumptions of small countries and zero
trade costs, but as will become clear, it does not drive our qualitative insights.
3.3 Cooperative product standards
When acting cooperatively, governments maximize their joint payoff taking into account the






































To rely on first-order conditions, we assume that Ωg(eg, pg(eg)) is concave in the vector of
standards eg, where pg(eg) denotes the market-clearing price as a function of the standards.
We require concavity of Ωg for any set of political parameters γig ≥ 0, so this assumption
implies that global welfare is concave in eg.24
Letting λg denote the Lagrange multiplier, it is direct to verify that the cooperative stan-
dards and world price for good g satisfy the following conditions (we suppress the arguments





























> 0 denotes the semi-elasticity of supply. We assume that the above system of
equations has a solution (which is then unique given our concavity assumption), and denote
it
(
{eAig}, pAg , λAg
)
.
The main difference between the noncooperative and cooperative product standards is
the presence of the multiplier λg in equation (13). Note that λg > 0 even if γig = 0, thus
the agreement changes standards for both political and environmental reasons, a finding that
we explore more thoroughly below. For now, just notice that all producers have a common
interest in loosening product standards, since they all benefit from the resulting increase in
the world price.
Also note that, since the demand semi-elasticities σig in general depend on prices, and the
agreement changes prices, we cannot immediately infer from equations (10) and (13) whether
the agreement loosens or tightens standards.25 We investigate this question next.
24Since the producer surplus πig is convex in pg, the reader might wonder if the assumption that
Ωg(eg, pg(eg)) is concave can hold for large values of the political parameters γig. The answer is yes. Consider
for simplicity the case of symmetric countries (so we can omit the i subscript). The key is to note that, as
eg →∞, the market price pg converges to the no-regulation price, and as a consequence πg flattens out. This
implies that πg(pg(eg)) is concave in eg for eg large enough. Moreover, the optimal eg is increasing in γg, so
when γg is larger πg(pg(eg)) is more likely to be concave in eg.
25To simplify some of the proofs, we make the technical assumptions that the semi-elasticities σig and εig
are bounded above and bounded away from zero.
18
3.4 What does the agreement do?
We now examine how the agreement changes product standards relative to the noncooperative
equilibrium. Here we take a heuristic approach, relegating the formal arguments to the
appendix.
We start with a local argument. Let us consider the international externalities caused by
a change in product standards starting from the noncooperative equilibrium. Suppose a posi-
tive measure of countries loosens their standards. This pushes up the world price by boosting
demand.26 How does this affect the joint payoff of all governments? Differentiating the joint
government payoff Ωg with respect to pg and plugging in the expression for noncooperative












The first term is positive and captures the beneficial effect of an increase in the world
price for producers worldwide. This is similar to the political world-price externality discussed
in the context of shallow integration, with the important difference that now all producers
benefit, not just exporters. The second term is also positive and is due to the fact that an
increase in the world price reduces consumption and thereby mitigates the local environmental
externality in all countries. Thus the aggregate international externality from loosening
product standards is positive for two reasons, a political one and an environmental one.
Having argued that, when starting from the noncooperative equilibrium, the aggregate
international externality from loosening product standards is positive, one can then show
that the “local agreement”entails increasing eig for all countries, where the local agreement
is defined as the local change in product standards that achieves the steepest rate of improve-
ment in the objective starting from noncooperative standards. Intuitively, if we marginally
loosen standards in a group of countries starting from noncooperative levels, this causes a
first-order positive externality on the other countries (as we argued above), while the loss
for the countries loosening their standards is second-order, because they were starting from
unilaterally-optimal levels, therefore the joint payoff Ωg increases.
We can show that this local result holds globally if certain suffi cient conditions are satisfied
(in addition to concavity of Ωg(eg, pg(eg))), and in particular, if countries are suffi ciently close









. Noting that each
term of the integral in the numerator has the same sign as deig, it follows that if any subset of countries
loosens their standards, the world price goes up.
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to symmetric, or if demand semi-elasticities σig do not vary too much with the price, or if
the political parameters γig are suffi ciently large. For the purposes of the next proposition
we assume that at least one of these suffi cient conditions is satisfied.
Proposition 3 The equilibrium agreement loosens all product standards.
Our model thus yields a sharp prediction: international regulatory cooperation should lead
to less stringent product standards. The intuition behind this result is that, if a group of
countries loosen their product standards, the world price goes up because demand increases,
and this in turn generates two externalities on other countries: it benefits producer lobbies
(political externality) and it mitigates local pollution (environmental externality).27
3.5 Is it good for you?
Recall from the discussion above that there are two motives from an agreement on product
standards: a political reason and an environmental reason. Letting ∆g ≡ WAg −WNg denote
the (positive or negative) welfare change caused by the agreement relative to the noncoop-
erative equilibrium, the political motive pushes ∆g down, since lobbying pressures distort
product standards in the cooperative scenario but not in the noncooperative scenario. In-
stead of the counter-lobbying we highlighted in the context of shallow integration, we now
have co-lobbying of all producers world-wide, since they share a common interest in boosting
the world price. The environmental motive, on the other hand, pushes ∆g up: intuitively, if
lobbying pressures were absent the agreement would be motivated just by welfare consider-
ations, and hence ∆g would be positive.
We illustrate the welfare implications of the agreement intuitively by focusing on the case
in which countries are symmetric, and later we extend the result to the case of asymmetric
countries. The key argument for the case of symmetric countries can be illustrated with the
help of Figure 1.28
27While the intuition outlined above suggests that this result should be fairly robust in a number of
dimensions, it does rely on the assumption that there are no fixed costs of standards compliance. In the
presence of such fixed costs, international cooperation might lead to the harmonization of standards (see for
example Grossman et al., 2019), in which case standards would get looser in some countries and tighter in
others. But even in such a setting, intuitively we expect that if lobbying pressures are strong enough the
agreement will loosen product standards on average.
28The key features of Figure 1 are proved in the Appendix, within the proof of Proposition 4. In what
follows we provide an intuitive explanation.
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This figure draws the noncooperative standards eNg and the cooperative standards e
A
g
as functions of the political-economy parameter γg. It also shows the welfare-maximizing
standards eWg and the welfare gain from the agreement, ∆g = W
A
g −WNg .
First note that the noncooperative standards do not depend on γg and are tighter than
the welfare-maximizing standards (eNg < e
W
g ).
29 Intuitively, starting from the noncooperative
equilibrium, loosening standards in a group of countries has a positive welfare externality
on other countries, because it increases the world price and in turn mitigates the local con-
sumption externalities in other countries. As a consequence, noncooperative standards are
too tight from the welfare point of view.
The cooperative standards eAg coincide with e
W
g for γg = 0 and are increasing in γg. In-
tuitively, stronger lobbying pressures lead to looser cooperative standards because producers
worldwide benefit from a rise in the world price.
The welfare gain from the agreement (∆g) is of course positive at γg = 0, but is decreasing
in γg and it becomes negative as γg crosses a critical value γ̄g. Intuitively, as γg increases,
cooperative standards get looser and looser, and at some point the implied welfare distortion
exceeds the welfare distortion in the over-tight noncooperative standards.
The result illustrated above for the case of symmetric countries extends to the case of
asymmetric countries, albeit in a slightly weaker version. To state the more general result, we
consider a proportional change in all political parameters γig. Formally, we define γig = γg ·νig
(with νig > 0 for all i, g) and vary the scaling factor γg. In general it is not guaranteed that
there is a unique value of γg for which ∆g = 0 as in Figure 1, but we can prove the following:
29This is an immediate corollary of Proposition 3, since the welfare-maximizing standards coincide with
the cooperative standards when γg = 0.
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Proposition 4 Cooperation on product standards increases global welfare if γg is suffi ciently
low, and decreases global welfare if γg is suffi ciently high.
In our model international cooperation on product standards leads to de-regulation, in
part because it induces “co-lobbying” from producer groups around the world. If lobbying
pressures are weak, such de-regulation is mild and actually increases welfare, because non-
cooperative standards are too tight from the welfare point of view, but if lobbying pressures
are strong, the agreement leads to excessive de-regulation and damages welfare.
We now return to a question raised earlier: how do the results change if consumption
taxes are available? As mentioned earlier, the first best can be implemented by combining
product standards with consumption taxes. In particular, it is easy to see that the first-
best variety is eig = 1√aig and the first-best consumption tax is tig =
√
aig.30 A key point
is that these policies maximize not only global welfare, but also unilateral welfare, thus
they are the noncooperative equilibrium policies. It is then an immediate corollary that the
cooperative policies decrease welfare relative to the noncooperative policies. In particular,










availability of consumption taxes makes the conclusion more pessimistic: a deep agreement
on product standards in this case is bad for welfare as long as there is any lobbying, and the
welfare loss is worse if lobbying pressures are stronger.
Before proceeding, it is important to put the results of this section in the right perspective.
As we mentioned in the Introduction, our model abstracts from considerations that could flip
the sign of the welfare effect of the agreement, such as the presence of large countries, trans-
boundary externalities or domestic-commitment motives, but regardless of the sign of the
welfare change, the more robust result is that lobbying by producer groups tends to decrease
the welfare gain (or increase the welfare loss) from an agreement on product standards.31
30One way to show that these policies implement the first best is to note that they are equivalent to the
Pigouvian emission-contingent tax tig(eig) = aigeig. To see this equivalence, note that given the Pigouvian
emission-contingent tax schedule, consumers will buy only the variety with the minimum consumer price,
and this is easily calculated to be eig = 1√aig . And conditional on this variety, the Pigouvian single-rate
consumption tax is tig =
√
aig.
31Here we provide a brief intuitive discussion of one of these extensions, namely the presence of large
countries. As a thought experiment, compare a world with a continuum of small countries with the same world
split into a few large countries. Suppose first that countries are symmetric. If lobbying pressures are strong
enough, non-cooperative standards are more ineffi cient in the large-country world, because an individual
country wants to loosen its standards in order to increase the world price and benefit local producers. On the
other hand, cooperative standards are the same in the small-country and large-country scenarios, since the
world is the same in the aggregate. Thus, the threshold level of γg beyond which the agreement is bad for
welfare should be higher in the large-country scenario. Next suppose countries are asymmetric, so there is
22
4 Deep integration: process standards
We now turn our attention to the welfare implications of agreements on process regulations.
By “process regulations” or “process standards” we mean restrictions on the production
processes that take place on domestic soil. Examples include environmental regulations for
factories and safety standards for workers. As discussed above, process standards of this kind
have been an important focus of many deep agreements in recent history.
To provide a welfare rationale for process standards we will allow for local production
externalities. To make our points in the most transparent way, in this section we focus on a
setting where process standards are the only policy instruments and production externalities
are the only market failures.
4.1 Setup
We now assume that each good g is homogenous but can be produced with a continuum
of technologies zg ∈ [0,∞), indexed by their “dirtiness.”Dirtier production processes are
cheaper: producers have to incur an abatement cost 1/zg in terms of the outside good in
order to use technology zg. From the point of view of an individual producer, aside from the
abatement cost all technologies are identical.
Production generates a negative externality, which is worse for dirtier processes (higher
zg). For concreteness we will focus on pollution externalities as our running example. Since
each producer is atomistic and hence does not take into account the pollution externality,




As will become clear, a single technology is used in equilibrium in each country i, say
technology zig. Producing yig units with technology zig generates local pollution zigyig. This
could be for example the amount of emissions from factories in country i. The disutility
caused by a unit of pollution to the representative consumer of country i is constant and
denoted by big, so the local externality is given by −bigzigyig(ppig).32
international trade in equilibrium. In this case there is also a terms-of-trade motive affecting a country’s choice
of standards: this motive pushes importers in the direction of tightening standards, while it pushes exporters
toward looser standards. In the aggregate, terms-of-trade motives can make non-cooperative standards more
or less effi cient, but if the terms-of-trade power of importers and exporters is not too unbalanced, this should
not overturn the conclusion of the symmetric case, namely that in a world of large countries the agreement
is less likely to be bad for welfare.
32As in the previous section, we are implicitly assuming that the disutility from pollution enters utility in
a separable way.
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Each government chooses emission standards {zig}g∈G for production activity taking place
on domestic soil. These can be interpreted as emission caps, since caps are always binding;
recall that adopting a cleaner technology is costly and does not directly benefit an individual
producer.
Due to consumer arbitrage, the consumer price is the same across the world, and we
denote it by pg. This can be interpreted as the “world”price in this setting. The producer
price net of abatement costs, on the other hand, is ppig = pg − 1zig . Thus, if an individual
country i tightens its process standards, the associated cost falls entirely on its producers.
Notice the contrast with the case of product standards, where the cost of tighter standards
falls on consumers.


















Note that, just as in the case of product standards, process standards are second-best
policies, because given the process zig producers do not internalize the production externality.
4.2 Noncooperative process standards





















As in the previous section we assume that Ωig is concave in eig, so we can rely on the











(1 + γig) for all i, (16)












dig (pg) . (17)
The noncooperative equilibrium process standards and world price for good g solve equa-





A key difference between product and process standards can already be noted from (16):
unlike the case of product standards, unilateral process standards are influenced by lobbies.
The reason is that the process standard adopted by country i directly affects the local pro-
ducer price, so to the extent that local producers have political power, they will push for
looser standards.33 Notice also that, if εig is held constant, noncooperative process standards
are tighter (zNig is lower) when production externalities are more important (big is higher), as
intuition would suggest.
4.3 Cooperative process standards
In the cooperative scenario, governments maximize their joint payoff taking into account the




































As in the previous section, we assume that Ωg(zg, pg(zg)) is concave in zg, where pg(zg)
denotes the market-clearing price as a function of the standards, and that there exists a
solution to the system of first-order conditions below.
It is easy to check that the cooperative process standards and world price for good g satisfy












1 + γig − λgεig
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where λg denotes the Lagrange multiplier. We let
(
{zAig}, pAg , λAg
)
denote the solution to the
above system of equations.
33Note that, if we increase the local producers’political power γig holding all else equal, the unilateral
standard zNig gets looser, but if we increase political powers in all countries at the same time, the world price
will go down, and this may in turn affect the supply elasticity εig. This will dampen or reinforce the impact
on zNig , depending on whether εig increases or decreases with the price.
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The key difference between noncooperative and cooperative process standards is the pres-
ence of the multiplier λg in equation (19). Note that λg is positive if γig > bigzigεig for all
i. This suggests that the agreement will tighten standards if lobbying pressures are suffi -
ciently strong, and loosen standards if lobbying pressures are suffi ciently weak. Intuitively,
the agreement changes process standards for both political and environmental reasons, as
in the case of product standards, but these two forces now push in opposite directions: the
political motive pushes for a tightening of standards, because this would increase the world
price and hence benefit all producers, while the environmental motive pushes for a loosening
of standards, because this would decrease the world price and hence reduce production and
pollution.
The intuition offered just above, however, does not take into account the fact that the
expression for λg depends on the optimal standards zig themselves (as well as the supply
elasticities, which in general depend on prices). Thus we need to go a bit deeper with the
analysis.
4.4 What does the agreement do?
To examine how the agreement changes process standards, we start by considering the in-
ternational externalities caused by a change in process standards when starting from the
noncooperative equilibrium. If a group of countries tightens their standards, this reduces
supply and hence pushes up the world price.34 How does this affect the joint payoff of all
governments? Differentiating the joint government payoffΩg with respect to pg and evaluat-







γigyig − bigzNig εigyig
)
(20)
The first term of (20) is positive and is due to the political externality exerted by the
increase in the world price. The second term is negative and is due to the fact that a higher
world price stimulates supply, thus increasing pollution world-wide. Intuitively, if lobbying
pressures are strong the net externality should be positive, thus the agreement should tighten
standards relative to the noncooperative equilibrium, while if lobbying pressures are weak,
the net externality should be negative, so the agreement should loosen standards.









. Noting that each
term of the integral in the numerator has the opposite sign as dzig, it follows that if any subset of countries
reduces their z’s, the world price goes up.
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We can confirm this intuition, in the following sense. Consider a proportional change
in the political parameters, by letting γig = γgνig and varying the scaling factor γg (as in
the previous section). First, it is obvious that if γg is small enough then
∂Ωg
∂pg
|NE < 0. Next
note that, as γg increases, z
N
ig increases with the speed of the square root. Recalling our
assumption that εig is bounded, it follows immediately that
∂Ωg
∂pg
|NE > 0 if γg is suffi ciently
large. It is then a small step to conclude, using a similar logic as in the previous section, that
the local agreement loosens all standards if γg is suffi ciently small and tightens all standards
if γg is suffi ciently large.
Similarly as in the case of product standards, we can show that this local result holds
globally if countries are suffi ciently close to symmetric, or if the supply semi-elasticities εig do
not vary too much with the price.35 For the purposes of the following proposition we assume
that at least one of these suffi cient conditions is satisfied.
Proposition 5 The equilibrium agreement loosens all process standards if the political power
of producers is suffi ciently weak and tightens all process standards if the political power of
producers is suffi ciently strong.
One way to interpret this result is that, when lobbying pressures are strong, the non-
cooperative equilibrium entails a “race to the bottom,”and the agreement acts to counter-
balance this tendency. But note that, as should be clear from the analysis above, what drives
the cooperative tightening of standards is the influence of producer groups themselves.
We are now ready to tackle the question of how international cooperation on process
standards affects global welfare.
4.5 Is it good for you?
We start by describing briefly our main result and its underlying logic. We will show that
the equilibrium agreement increases welfare if γg is suffi ciently small or suffi ciently large, and
may decrease welfare for intermediate values of γg. The starkest difference with respect to our
earlier result for product standards is the fact that, when political pressures are strong (γg
large), a deep agreement is bad for welfare in the case of product standards, while it is good
for welfare in the case of process standards. The fundamental reason for this difference is that
35We can also show that, if γg is suffi ciently large, the globally optimal agreement tightens all process
standards, regardless of country asymmetries or variable semi-elasticities. In other words, the second part of
the local result holds globally without the need of further conditions. The proof of this claim can be found
within the proof of Proposition 5.
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the interests of producers around the world are no longer aligned when it comes to process
regulations, since each producer lobby prefers weak regulations at home and strict regulations
abroad. As a result, the deep agreement now brings about counter-lobbying, thereby diluting
the overall effect of lobbying on process standards. Notice how the nature of counter-lobbying
here differs from the case of shallow integration that we analyzed in Section 2: there, the key
political cleavage was between import-competing interests and export interests.
Also note that, in terms of underlying economic mechanisms, a key difference between
product and process standards is that these two forms of regulation have opposite impacts on
world prices: tightening product standards raises local consumer prices, hence reduces local
demand and puts downward pressure on world prices; while tightening process standards
reduces local producer net prices, hence reduces local supply and puts upward pressure on
world prices.
We now illustrate in more detail the logic behind our result. We start by focusing on
the special case in which countries are symmetric and the semi-elasticity of supply (εg) is
constant, and then we extend the result to the more general case. We illustrate our arguments
with the help of Figure 2.36
This figure shows the noncooperative standards zNg , the cooperative standards z
A
g and the
welfare maximizing standards zWg as functions of γg, as well as the welfare change from the
agreement, ∆g = WAg −WNg .
Absent lobbying pressures (γg = 0), noncooperative process standards are too tight from
the welfare point of view (zNg < z
W
g ), since governments do not internalize the negative
36The key features of Figure 2 are proved formally in the Appendix, within the proof of Proposition 6.
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international externality caused by tightening standards. As γg increases, noncooperative
standards become looser, since loosening standards unilaterally benefits local producers. The
cooperative standards zAg coincide with the welfare-maximizing standards z
W
g when γg = 0
and are also increasing in γg. However, the z
A
g schedule is flatter than the z
N
g schedule,
since in the cooperative scenario governments internalize the negative political terms-of-
trade externality from loosening standards, and such externality becomes stronger as γg
increases. This captures the counter-lobbying intuition we mentioned earlier: looser domestic
standards harm the interests of producers abroad, thus cooperation moderates the loosening
of standards that is brought about by increases in lobbying pressures.
The welfare change from the agreement (∆g) is of course positive at γg = 0, but more
interestingly, it must be positive again for γg large enough. The latter statement follows






g , together with the assumption
that welfare is concave in zg. Furthermore, ∆g must be negative for an intermediate range




g ), because the noncooperative standards
coincide with the welfare-maximizing standards for a critical value of γg. Thus the welfare
change from the agreement is non-monotonic, being positive if lobbying pressures are low or
high, but negative when lobbying pressures are intermediate.
The result illustrated just above generalizes to the case of asymmetric countries and
variable semi-elasticities, albeit in a slightly weaker version. The only change is that in general
there may or may not be an intermediate range of γg for which the agreement decreases
welfare. In order to state the more general result, we consider as usual a proportional change
in all political parameters γig, with γg denoting the scaling factor:
Proposition 6 Cooperation on process standards increases global welfare if γg is suffi ciently
low or suffi ciently high, and may decrease global welfare for intermediate values of γg.
As discussed above, the result that the equilibrium agreement increases global welfare
when lobbying is strong enough contrasts sharply with the case of product standards, and the
basic reason is that international negotiations bring about countervailing lobbying between
the domestic producers of a given country and the producers in the remaining countries.37
37One possible concern is that, if there is countervailing lobbying and lobbies are worse off in the cooperative
scenario than in the non-cooperative equilibrium, they may oppose participation in the agreement at the ex-
ante stage (we thank Dani Rodrik for raising this point). One way to think about this issue is the following.
Suppose that in each country the government and the lobbies negotiate ex-ante on whether to participate in
the agreement. In this negotiation, the outside option of the government is to go ahead and sign an agreement
without the lobbies, and moreover, all governments and lobbies are jointly better off under the agreement
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It is also worth emphasizing a subtle aspect of the result in Proposition 6: in spite of the
countervailing-lobbying effect, the agreement may decrease welfare for an intermediate range
of lobbying pressures (and as noted above, this intermediate range of γg is guaranteed to
exist if countries are symmetric). The intuition is the following: if governments are welfare-
maximizers (γg = 0), noncooperative standards are too tight, so a moderate amount of
political pressures makes noncooperative standards more effi cient, and there is a critical level




g in Figure 2). Clearly, then, for γg close to
this critical level the agreement must be bad for welfare.38
Finally, what does the model suggest regarding the impact of lobbying on the welfare
change from the agreement (∆g)? Recall that, in the case of product standards, increasing
the power of lobbies reduces ∆g (see Figure 1). Here the answer is different and more subtle,
as Figure 2 suggests: increasing the power of lobbies initially worsens the welfare implications
of the agreement, but this effect is reversed as the power of lobbies becomes large.
5 Integrated Model
Thus far we have examined the implications of international cooperation on product and
process standards with the aid of two separate models. We now consider an integrated
model to explore the interactions between these two dimensions of deep integration in a
setting with both consumption and production externalities. We maintain the assumption
that shallow integration has previously been achieved and tariffs have been eliminated.
We essentially merge the economic structures that we considered in sections 3 and 4, by
allowing for a continuum of varieties and a continuum of technologies. If country i imposes
product standard eig and process standard zig, international arbitrage ensures that the local
consumer price is pg + 1eig and the local producer price is pg−
1
zig
, where pg can be interpreted
as the “world price,” or alternatively, the price that producers and consumers of country
i would face if country i imposed no standards (eig = zig = ∞). The local consumption
and production externalities associated with these standards are respectively −aigeigdig and
than in the non-cooperative equilibrium. This suggests that an agreement will be signed even if it makes
lobbies worse off (and governments do not have to compensate lobbies for taking this course of action, since
their outside option is to sign the agreement).
38On a separate note, the reader might wonder how our results on process standards would change if
we allowed for production taxes. But recall that if production subsidies (i.e. negative production taxes)
were available, lobbies would focus only on production subsidies, thus the model would have nothing to say
about the impact of lobbying on regulations. This is the same issue that arises if production subsidies are

































































































































































where λg as usual denotes the Lagrange multiplier. Note that λg now reflects the effect of a
change in the world price on the joint government payoff through three channels: the political
channel, the consumption-externality channel and the production-externality channel.
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We now examine how the agreement changes standards relative to the noncooperative
equilibrium. Here we focus on the “local”agreement. As in the previous sections, the local
results hold globally under certain suffi cient conditions.
The first step is to understand how the local agreement changes the world price. This
depends on how a small change in the world price affects the governments’joint payoff. It is









igσigdig − bigzNig εigyig
)
(21)
The local agreement leads to an increase in the world price if and only if ∂Ωg
∂pg
|NE > 0. We
can already make two observations. The first one is that, in each sector g, the local agreement
loosens all product standards eig and tightens all process standards zig if
∂Ωg
∂pg
|NE > 0, and
vice-versa if ∂Ωg
∂pg
|NE < 0. This is a consequence of the fact that loosening product standards
increases pg, while loosening process standards decreases pg. Thus the local agreement always
changes product standards and process standards in opposite directions.
The second observation is that, if lobbying pressures are suffi ciently strong, the local
agreement loosens all product standards and tightens all process standards. It is easy to









ig εigyig if the γig parameters are blown up
suffi ciently.
We can say something more if we impose symmetry across countries and constant semi-
elasticities. First, in this case it is easy to show that the local results described just above are
guaranteed to hold globally. Second, there exists a threshold γ̃g ≥ 0 such that the agreement







possibly empty), and vice-versa if γg > γ̃g.
39 The cooperative and noncooperative
standards are depicted as functions of γg in Figure 3, which focuses on the case where the
interval (0, γ̃g) is nonempty (the fact that we have drawn the zg schedules above the eg
schedules has no significance).
39To see this, first note from (21) that the agreement increases eg and decreases zg if γg+agσge
N
g −bgεgzNg >
0 (where we used dg = yg from symmetry and market clearing), and vice-versa if γg + agσge
N
g − bgεgzNg < 0.
Next observe that there can be at most one value of γg such that γg + agσge
N




= 1 (recalling that eNg is independent of γg) and bgεgz
N
g is concave in γg, with
∂(bgεgzNg )
∂γg
|γg=0 < 1. The claim follows immediately.
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Note the two additional results that emerge relative to the previous sections, where prod-
uct and process standards were analyzed separately. First, the agreement always changes
product and process standards in opposite directions. And second, when lobbying pressures
are weak, there are two new possibilities that could not arise when standards were considered
in isolation: (i) the agreement may tighten product standards (if the interval (0, γ̃g) is non-
empty, as in Figure 3), and (ii) the agreement may tighten process standards (if the interval
(0, γ̃g) is empty, a case not considered in Figure 3).
Next we consider the welfare impacts of regulatory cooperation. We continue to focus on
the case of symmetric countries and constant semi-elasticities.
For γg = 0, and hence for γg small enough, the agreement is obviously good for welfare.
The more interesting question is what happens for large γg. We can show that, when γg
is large, the agreement decreases global welfare if the production externality parameter bg
is small enough (relative to the other parameters), while it increases global welfare if the
consumption externality parameter ag is small enough (relative to the other parameters).
Intuitively, if bg = 0 then no process standards are imposed, either in the non-cooperative
equilibrium or in the cooperative scenario, so the model essentially reduces to the product-
standards-only setting of Section 3, where the agreement is bad for welfare if γg is large; and
the same is true if bg is small enough. A similar intuition applies for the case in which the
consumption externality parameter ag is small. Thus, when lobbying pressures are strong,
the agreement is bad for welfare if the relative importance of production externalities versus
consumption externalities is small, because in this case process standards play a small role
relative to product standards, while it is good for welfare in the opposite case.
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6 International ownership linkages
For many critics of deep integration agreements, the influence of industry lobbies is synony-
mous with the power of multinational corporations. While our model cannot directly speak
to the role of multinational corporations, since there is no meaningful notion of firms in our
perfect-competition setting, we can easily allow for foreign ownership of production factors in
our model. In this section, we therefore examine how the presence of international ownership
linkages affects the main results we obtained so far.
To this end, we now assume that citizens of country i own a share θijg of the specific
factor in country j and thus receive a share θijg of the rents πjg associated with it. As a




since these are now the rents that accrue to country i’s citizens. We build directly on our
integrated model from the previous section and focus on the case of constant semi-elasticities
for simplicity.








θijgπjg (·) + Sig (·)− aigeigdig (·)− bigzigyig (·)
























Not surprisingly, noncooperative product standards eNig are exactly the same as in the
absence of foreign ownership. This is because governments cannot use product standards to
affect local producer prices in our small country setting, so the ownership of specific factors
does not matter.
Noncooperative process standards zNig , on the other hand, are affected by international
ownership linkages. In particular, zNig is increasing in the domestic ownership share θiig.
Intuitively, in the presence of foreign ownership the government has stronger incentives to
tighten process standards, since more of the costs are borne by foreign citizens. Note also that
noncooperative process standards are less sensitive to the political parameters γig than in
the absence of foreign ownership. This is because a government can only affect domestically-
generated producer surplus with its choice of standards, and foreign ownership implies that
only a share of this surplus accrues to domestic citizens.
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Notice that, if lobbying powers do not vary across countries (i.e. γig = γg for all i),
cooperative standards are the same as in the absence of foreign ownership. Intuitively, in
this case what matters for the governments’ joint payoff is worldwide producer surplus,
not the distribution of producer surplus across countries. On the other hand, if lobbying
powers vary across countries, foreign ownership does affect cooperative standards, because
now the producer surplus generated in a given country (πig) is weighted by the country-
specific political parameters γjg according to their respective foreign ownership shares θjig.
Focusing on the case of symmetric countries, we can depict the cooperative and nonco-
operative standards as functions of γg with the help of Figure 4:
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As Figure 4 illustrates, introducing foreign ownership implies only one change: the zNg
schedule shifts down and becomes flatter (as illustrated by the dashed line in Figure 4), and
as a consequence, the agreement loosens process standards for a larger interval of γg relative
to the setting without foreign ownership. With this observation in hand, we can now examine
how foreign ownership affects the welfare impacts of regulatory cooperation.
We continue to focus on the case of symmetric countries for simplicity. In this case, the
importance of foreign ownership is captured by a single parameter (for each sector g), namely
the foreign ownership share 1 − θiig ≡ 1 − θg. Clearly, an increase in the foreign ownership
share reduces the welfare gains (or increases the welfare losses) from regulatory cooperation,
at least if lobbying is suffi ciently strong. The reason can be seen from Figure 4: if γg is
large enough, the introduction of foreign ownership pushes noncooperative process standards
closer to their welfare-maximizing levels, without affecting anything else, and therefore the
welfare gain from cooperation must decrease.
It is worth emphasizing two points in relation to this result. First, foreign ownership does
not reduce the welfare gains from international cooperation because the cooperative outcome
has deteriorated, but rather because the noncooperative equilibrium has improved. Second,
this is only true for suffi ciently high γg; indeed the opposite holds if γg is suffi ciently low.
At γg = 0, for example, foreign ownership pushes process standards away from their effi cient
levels, so the welfare gains from international cooperation increase. This also illustrates how
our result differs from related results by Blanchard (2010) and Blanchard et al. (2018),
where foreign ownership always improves the effi ciency of the noncooperative equilibrium by
inducing countries to internalize part of the terms-of-trade externalities they impose on their
trading partners. In our setting, terms-of-trade considerations do not drive noncooperative
policy choices, so this logic does not apply.
Finally notice that, while in the absence of foreign ownership a country’s choice of stan-
dards affects other countries only through world prices, in the presence of foreign ownership
there is an additional channel of international externality. A country’s choice of process
standards (but not of product standards) affects other countries through local prices. For
this reason, the agreement corrects process standards in two ways relative to the noncoop-
erative equilibrium: one is reflected by the multiplier λg, which is linked to the world-price
externality; and one is reflected in the fact that, if we set λg = 0, the cooperative standards
zAg are still different —and in particular they are looser —than the noncooperative standards
zNg . Also note that this is the reason why in the absence of foreign ownership the agreement
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always changes product and process standards in opposite directions, while this is not the
case here.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have examined the welfare impacts of international regulatory cooperation
in a world where producer lobbies can influence international negotiations. The welfare
effects of international cooperation can be very different depending on whether it focuses on
product standards or on process standards. International cooperation on product standards
can decrease welfare, and this is more likely to happen when producer lobbies are stronger.
On the other hand, international cooperation on process standards tends to increase welfare
when lobbying pressures are strong. At a broad level, a key determinant of the welfare impact
of deep agreements is whether the distortionary impact of lobbying is stronger in the non-
cooperative scenario or in the context of international negotiations. This in turn depends
crucially on whether the policy interests of producer lobbies in different countries are aligned
or in conflict: the former situation tends to occur in the case of product standards, while the
latter situation tends to occur in the case of production regulations.
There are several extensions of our model that would be interesting to explore in future
research. First, we have abstracted from fixed costs of compliance with product standards.
Such fixed costs are undoubtedly relevant and often mentioned as a rationale for international
harmonization of standards. Revisiting our questions in the presence of such fixed costs would
require a model with imperfect competition, and the key intuitions might change in major
ways relative to the present paper. Second, we have not considered horizontal standards.
Note that the notions of co-lobbying and counter-lobbying, which are central in our model,
are intrinsically vertical notions (do lobbies agree on tightening versus loosening standards),
so they would not apply to a setting of horizontal standards, and hence one would have to
entirely revisit the question of whether lobbying has a more distortionary effect on cooperative
policies or on unilateral policies.
Another important question that we have not addressed in this paper is the role of global
supply chains. Intuitively, in the presence of global supply chains, the welfare effects of
regulatory cooperation would depend on where regulations hit along the supply chain. For
example, consider vertical product standards. The interests of producer lobbies around the
world are likely to be aligned when it comes to standards on final products, so regulatory
cooperation will strengthen the impact of lobbies on regulations. But this would not nec-
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essarily be true for standards on intermediate products, because in this case the interests
of upstream and downstream lobbies worldwide would be in conflict, so an agreement may
dilute the overall influence of lobbies.
Finally, we have focused on global agreements, but it would be interesting to explore the
welfare impacts of regional agreements when such agreements are negotiated under lobbying
pressures. While there is a large literature that examines the welfare impacts of regional
agreements of the “shallow” kind, including a few models where such agreements are ne-
gotiated under political pressure (e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 1995b, and Ornelas, 2005),




Proof of Proposition 1
Let fig (pg + τ ig) ≡
γigyig(pg+τ ig)
−m′ig(pg+τ ig)
and let ({τ̂ ig(κg)}i∈Mg , p̂g(κg)) denote the solution to the
following system:
τ ig = fig (pg + τ ig)− κg, i ∈Mg∫
i∈Mg




Note that κg is a parameter that “connects” the noncooperative equilibrium with the
cooperative solution. When κg = 0 the solution of the above system is the noncooperative
equilibrium, and when κg = λg the solution of the above system coincides with the cooperative
solution.
It is not hard to see that, given the assumption that there exists a unique solution to the
above system for any κg ∈ [0, λg] (stated in footnote 17), we must have f ′ig < 1 for all i when









































































Thus, as we move from the noncooperative equilibrium to the cooperative equilibrium,
τ̂ ig decreases for all i, and pg increases. We can conclude that τAig < τ
N
ig for all i. QED
Proof of Proposition 2

























Thus, as we move from the noncooperative equilibrium to the cooperative equilibrium,
the domestic price decreases in each importing country.
We can now trace how global welfare changes as κg changes. The global welfare associated
with
(
{τ̂ ig (κg)}i∈Mg , p̂g (κg)
)




[πig (p̂g + τ̂ ig) + Sig (p̂g + τ̂ ig) + τ̂ igmig (p̂g + τ̂ ig)] ,
where we keep in mind, here and below, that p̂g and τ̂ ig are functions of κg. Differentiating








ig (p̂g + τ̂ ig)
∂ (p̂g + τ̂ ig)
∂κg
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Recalling that m′ig < 0,
∂(p̂g+τ̂ ig)
∂κg
< 0, and τ̂ ig goes from the noncooperative level to the
cooperative level as κg goes from 0 to λg, it follows that a suffi cient condition forWAg −WNg > 0
is that cooperative tariffs are not too negative. QED
Proof of Proposition 3
We first establish that the local agreement increases eig for all i. This follows from
two observations. The first one is that Ωg is increasing in each eig when evaluated at the






























= 0 for all i at the noncooperative equilibrium and recall ∂Ωig
∂pg
> 0 from
the main text. Furthermore, each term of the integral at the numerator has the same sign
as deig, hence the claim. The second observation is that, since the gradient of Ωg at the
noncooperative standards eNg is positive for all standards, it follows that the direction of
steepest ascent of the objective Ωg starting from eNg entails loosening all of the standards.
Next we show that this local result holds globally if (i) countries are suffi ciently close to
symmetric, or (ii) demand semi-elasticities σig do not vary too much with the price, or (iii)
the political economy parameters γig are suffi ciently large.
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(i) Suppose that countries are symmetric. Given our regularity assumptions, it is easy to
show that the noncooperative standards as well as the cooperative standards are symmetric;
we denote them as eNg and e
A
g respectively. Note that, letting Ωg (eg, pg (eg)) denote the joint
government payoff given a common standard eg, this function is maximized by eAg . Also note
that our assumption that Ωg (eg, pg (eg)) is concave in the vector of standards eg implies that
Ωg (eg, pg (eg)) is concave in eg.
We know from the local argument in the main text that dΩg
deg
|NE > 0. Given that
Ωg (eg, p (eg)) is concave in eg, it follows immediately that eAg > e
N
g . A continuity argu-
ment can then be used to extend this result to the case where countries are suffi ciently close
to symmetric.
(ii) Suppose that σig is constant in the price for all i and g. It is then immediate from
equations (10) and (13) that eAig > e
N
ig . A continuity argument can then be used to extend
this result to the case where the demand semi-elasticities σig do not vary too much with the
price.
(iii) Let γig = γgνig (with νig > 0 for all i and g) and consider the limit as γg →∞. We
will prove that limγg→∞ e
A
ig = ∞. Recalling that eNig is independent of γig, we will conclude




























Note that all the terms inside the square root are positive, and σig is bounded by assump-





is bounded away from zero we can conclude that
limγg→∞ e
A
ig =∞. To see why this is indeed the case, first recall our assumption that σig and
εig are bounded above and bounded away from zero. Next note that eAig cannot go to zero
for any country as γg → ∞, because this would imply that production costs go to infinity,
and this clearly cannot be optimal. Given that eAig is bounded away from zero for all i, it
is easy to argue using the market clearing condition that the world price (pg) and consumer
prices (pg + 1eig ) are bounded above and bounded away from zero as γg → ∞. This in turn






is bounded away from zero, hence the claim. QED
Proof of Proposition 4
41
Before proving the more general result stated in Proposition 4, we focus on the case of
symmetric countries and prove the stronger result illustrated in Figure 1.
(i) We now show that, if countries are symmetric, there exists a cutoff value γ̄g such that
∆g > 0 for γg < γ̄g and ∆g < 0 for γg > γ̄g.
We begin by characterizing eNg , e
W
g , and e
A






= 0, and that eAg = e
W
g for γg = 0.
Next we show that eAg is increasing in γg. Let Ω̃g(eg, γg) ≡ Ωg
(
eg, p (eg) , γg
)
(with a slight






















We now turn to characterizingWNg andW
A












< 0, since eAg maximizes welfare when γg = 0 and global




The final step is to show that ∆g < 0 for suffi ciently large γg. Recalling from the proof of
the previous proposition that limγg→∞ e
A
ig =∞, it is clear that limγg→∞WAg = −∞, so there
must exist some γ̄g such that ∆g < 0 for γg > γ̄g.
(ii) We now allow for asymmetric countries. Recall that we define γig = γgνig and vary
γg. With asymmetric countries, it is still trivially true that ∆g > 0 for γg = 0, and thus also
for suffi ciently low γg. Moreover, it is also still true that limγg→∞ e
A
ig =∞ for all i and thus




> 0 for all γg, so the uniqueness of the cutoff value γ̄g is no longer
guaranteed. QED
Proof of Proposition 5
In the main text we established that ∂Ωg
∂pg
|NE is positive if γg is large enough and negative
if γg is small enough. Using a similar argument as in the proof of Proposition 3, it is easy
to argue that the local agreement tightens all process standards if γg is large enough and
loosens all process standards if γg is small enough.
Now we show that this local result holds globally if either (i) countries are suffi ciently
close to symmetric or (ii) supply semi-elasticities εig do not vary too much with the price.
Furthermore we show that (iii) the globally optimal agreement tightens all standards if γg is
large enough, without the need of further conditions.
(i) Suppose that countries are symmetric and denote the common standard by zg. We
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know from the local result that dΩg
dzg
|NE > 0 if γg is suffi ciently small and
dΩg
dzg
|NE < 0 if γg
is suffi ciently large. Our assumption that Ωg (zg, p (zg)) is concave in zg then immediately
implies zAg > z
N




g if γg is suffi ciently large. A continuity
argument extends this result to the case where countries are suffi ciently close to symmetric.
(ii) Suppose that εig is constant in the price for all i and g. We know that λg < 0 if γg is
suffi ciently small and λg > 0 if γg is suffi ciently large. It is then immediate from comparing
equations (16) and (19) that zAg > z
N




g if γg is suffi ciently
large. A continuity argument extends this result to the case where supply semi-elasticities
εig do not vary too much with the price.








































Using a similar argument as in the proof of Proposition 3 one can show that dig and yig are
bounded above and bounded away from zero as γg →∞, and we have assumed that σig and
















Suppose by contradiction that the above limit is negative. Then, using the fact that all
terms other than γg and z
A
ig are bounded above and bounded away from zero, this would
imply that zAig increases at least with linear speed as γg → ∞. Then the expression in (23)
would increase at most with linear speed. But then the expression for zAig in (22) would imply
that zAig increases at most with the speed of the square root, a contradiction. The claim thus
follows. QED
Proof of Proposition 6
Before proving the more general result stated in Proposition 6, we prove the stronger
result illustrated in Figure 2 for the special case of symmetric countries and constant semi-
elasticities.
(i) Suppose that countries are symmetric and semi-elasticities are constant. We will show
that there exist critical levels γLg < γ
H
g such that the agreement increases welfare if γg < γ
L
g ,










We begin by characterizing the schedules zNg , z
W
g , and z
A
g as functions of γg. It is im-
mediate that zWg > z
N
g at γg = 0 and
dzNg
dγg























γg − bgzAg εg
εg + σg
It is easy to verify that
dzAg
dγg
> 0 and dλg
dγg







We are now ready to show that there exist cutoffs γLg < γ
H
g such that ∆g > 0 if γg < γ
L
g
or γg > γ
H







Let γMg denote the value of γg such that the noncooperative standard is effi cient, that is
zNg = z
W
g , and let γ
H




g . Clearly, we have ∆g > 0 at
γg = 0, ∆g < 0 at γg = γ
M
g , and ∆g = 0 at γg = γ
H
g . Note also thatWg is increasing in zg for
zg < z
W
g and decreasing in zg for zg > z
W
g , given that z
W












> 0, and hence d∆g
dγg
< 0, so there exists
a critical value γLg between 0 and γ
M

















it must be ∆g < 0. Finally note that for
γg > γ
H




g ≤ zNg ≤ zAg .
(ii) We now prove the more general result stated in Proposition 6 allowing for asymmetric
countries and variable semi-elasticities.
Clearly, it is still true that ∆g > 0 for γg = 0, and thus also for suffi ciently low γg. In
the following, we show that limγg→∞∆g > 0. The possibility that ∆g may be negative for
intermediate values of γg follows from part (i) of this proof.
We follow a similar approach as in our proof of Proposition 2. Let ({ẑig(κg)}, p̂g(κg)) be













1 + γig − κgεig (·)
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The interpretation of the parameter κg again is that it “connects”the noncooperative equi-
librium with the cooperative solution. When κg = 0 the solution of the above system is the
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noncooperative equilibrium, and when κg = λg it coincides with the cooperative solution.
We can trace how global welfare changes as κg changes. The global welfare associated with


















where we keep in mind, here and below, that p̂g and τ̂ ig are functions of κg. Differentiating







































































Invoking a similar limit argument as in part (iii) of the proof of Proposition 5, it is easy
to see that the term in the large brackets is negative for suffi ciently large γg. This is clearly






























. If this inequality were not satis-
fied, the system of equations (19) defining zAig would have no solution, violating our assump-








and λg is large enough, it is easy to argue that the argument of the
square root is negative.
Recalling from Proposition 5 that the agreement tightens all process standards for suffi -
ciently large γg, we have
∂ẑig
∂κg
< 0 for all i, and thus ∂Ŵg
∂κg
> 0 along the entire path κg ∈ [0, λg]
for suffi ciently large γg. It follows that the welfare change from the agreement is positive
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